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Abstract 
In this paper, I survey the current literature relating to the relationship between the institution 
and foreign direct investment (FDI). In doing so, I have comprehensively analyzed two most 
recent paper written by Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Daude and Stein (2007). Both articles 
have used a difference econometric methodology, explanatory variables and institutions 
measurement  in order to link whether institution variables matter or not in influencing the 
behaviour of foreign investors, in particular from Multinational Enterprise (MNE’s). Based 
on these papers, they found that a better institution in term of government stability, 
investment profile, internal and external conflicts, law and order, democratic accountability 
and bureaucratic quality are pre-requisite for promoting the investment from MNE’s. 
Therefore, the policy makers have to maintain a sound institution in order to take advantage 
the inflow of foreign investment. However, I argued that a sound institution is an 
inadequately in explaining the behaviour of MNE’s. A good interaction between institutional 
variables and other macro variables such as a well-developed financial system, favourable 
growth performance, high trade openness, excellent infrastructure development, low country 
risk as well as an attractive fiscal and monetary incentive are also vital in stimulating the 
inflow of FDI to the host countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is generally accepted that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has a favourable impact as a key 
driver in promoting long run economic growth, particularly for the less-developed countries 
(LDC’s), which have experienced shortage capital accumulation for their development. 
Indeed, most of the LDC’s who have effectively attracted more FDI have undergone a 
persistency in their economic growth. Thus, most of the LDC’s are highly dependent on FDI 
as an engine of economic growth and have been trying to attract foreign investors particularly 
from Multinational Enterprises (MNE’s) by offering various fiscal and monetary incentives. 
As a result, most of the LDC’s have been competing with each other in order to attract 
investment from MNE’s, particularly the foreign investors from the advanced nations.  
 
There is consensus among academic economists that FDI has a positive effect on 
economic growth. Therefore, a significant effect of FDI on economic growth has motivated 
many researchers to study the main factors which determined the inflow of FDI across 
countries. It is well-documented in the literature that the most important factors which 
determined the inflow of FDI are domestic market size, trade openness, cost of labour, 
persistency in economic growth as well as low tax and tariff. However, most of the prior 
studies have not taken into account the role of institutions on FDI. Meanwhile, since the 
1990’s the role of institutions become more important as a main factor in stimulating the 
foreign investors. Quere et al. (2007) have stated three reasons why the quality of institutions 
may matter for attracting FDI. First, by raising productivity prospects, good governance 
infrastructure may attract foreign investors. A second reason is that poor institutions can 
bring additional costs to FDI (for example, the case of corruption). A third reason is due to 
the sunk cost which FDI is especially vulnerable to any form of uncertainty, including that 
stemming from poor government efficiency, policy reversals and weak enforcement of 
property rights and legal system in general. For that reason, by maintaining a quality 
institution it can attract more investment, which in turn can expedite the economics growth 
process.  
 
Schmieding (1993) has stated that institutions encompass not only bureaucracies and 
administration but also, more importantly, the entire body of formal laws, rules and 
regulations as well as the informal conventions and patterns of behaviour that constitute the 
non-budget constraint under which economic agents can pursue their own individuals ends. 
In addition, the quality of institutions are closely related to reducing information 
asymmetries, as a high quality institution channels information about market conditions, 
goods and participants, which in turn can encourage investment, either domestic or foreign. 
Indeed, the deeper understanding of the role of institutions in stimulating the inflow of FDI is 
pivotal for the developing countries in order to design an appropriate FDI-friendly policy. 
The empirical relationship between institutions and FDI has produced a mixed result. For 
example, Brunetti and Weder (1998) have found that there is a negative link between 
institutional uncertainty and private investment. In comparison, Lee and Mansfeild (1996) 
have found a positive relationship between FDI and intellectual property protection.  Wei 
(1997, 2000) also found that the uncertainty about corruption has negative effects on FDI 
location. This is due to the fact that corruption will incur the additional cost of doing business 
because the investors have to bribe official in order to get the licenses and permits.  
 
In this paper, I survey the current literature relating to the relationship between 
institution and foreign direct investment (FDI). Based on my best knowledge, so far there is 
no study has been done for surveying the literature relating to FDI and institution. This area 
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of research has examined empirically by several prior studies, for example; Brunetti and 
Weder (1998), Lee and Mansfeild (1996), Brunetti and Weder, (1998) Wei (1997, 2000) and 
Quere et al. (2007). However, the focus on this paper is to compare the two most recent 
articles written by Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Daude and Stein (2007), which discusses 
comprehensively the role of institution on FDI. Both articles have used a difference 
econometric methodology, explanatory variables and institutions measurement  in order to 
link whether institution variables matter or not in influencing the behaviour of foreign 
investors particularly MNE’s, in order to make the investment decision.  
 
The structure of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 analyzed the relationship 
between institution and FDI by comparing the article written by Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
and Daude and Stein (2007). Section 3 discusses some comments and suggestion about the 
related article. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Institution and FDI : Some Stylized Facts 
 
2.1 Motivation and Contribution 
Both articles attempt to investigate whether the quality of institutions matter or not in 
influencing the inflow of FDI by utilizing the cross country analysis (cross section and panel 
data technique). This study is vital because a better institution will attract more foreign 
capital, which in turn can accelerate long-run economic growth particularly in LDC’s.  In 
fact, any changes in the institutions variable could affect the investment decision by the 
MNE’s. Various measurements of institutional variables have been tested in order to examine 
their links on FDI. The paper is also quite difference from the existing literature because most 
of the prior studies have focused mainly on the effect of corruption or political risk on FDI. 
 
2.2 Data and Variables 
FDI Data 
Daude and Stein (2007) have used the  bilateral FDI stocks from the UNCTAD FDI 
database which the dataset comprises FDI from 34 source countries (developed countries) to 
the 152 host countries for the period from 1982 to 2002. In contrast, Busse and Hefeker 
(2007) have utilised FDI per capita (net inflow in current US dollars) for the period 1984 to 
2003 for a sample of 83 developing countries.  
 
Institution Variables 
Both articles have utilised difference measurement for institutional variables. Daude 
and Stein (2007) have used a broader set which comprises three sets of institutional variables 
based on expert’s report, survey and combination of both in their study. First, they used the 
set of institutional variables which developed by Kaufman et al. (1999a). There are six 
difference institution indicators which represent a difference dimension of governance such 
as voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. This clustering of institutional 
variables is crucial in order to identify whether some dimension of governance matters or not 
in attracting the FDI location. Second, political risk where the variables can be found from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. There are several indicators that have 
been chosen such as risk of expropriation, government stability, democratic accountability, 
law and orders and corruption. Third, the institutions indicators which also collected from 
the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank. This survey 
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has focused on the quality of the courts, quality of the central government, corruption and 
change in law and regulations.  
 
Conversely, Busse and Hefeker (2007) have employed 12 political risk and political 
institutions indicators which are taken from ICRG provided by Political Risk Services (PRS) 
Group to gauge the quality of political institutions. The variables are government stability, 
socio-economic pressure, investment profile/risk, internal conflict, external conflict, level of 
corruption, the influence of military in politics, religious tension, law and order, tension 
among ethnic groups, democratic accountability of the government and the strength and  
quality of bureaucracy. Each indicator is scaled from 0 to 12 with the highest value 
indicating better institution and less political risk. All the 12 indicators are expected to be 
positively related on FDI flows because less political risk and better political institution can 
attract foreign investment due to a lower risk premium. 
 
 
Control Variables 
Besides the role of institution on FDI, several others explanatory variables have also 
been considered in the studies. Busse and Hefeker (2007) have taken into account four 
control variables in their regression model such as Gross National Income per capita, the real 
growth rate of GNI per capita in percent, the ratio of import and export to GDP and GDP 
deflator as a proxy for inflation. In comparison, Daude and Stein (2007) have used seven 
controls variables in their model (refer to Equation 1 for detailed explanation). The 
selections of the control variables are also consistent with the theoretical underpinning and 
the determinants of FDI literature.  
 
2.3 Econometric Methodology/Model 
 Most of the empirical studies of FDI determinants usually utilized the gravity model. 
Therefore, Daude and Stein (2007) have employed a benchmark model proposed by Carr et 
al. (2001) and added the measurement of institutional quality in the model. The empirical 
model is as follows: 
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Where, 
FDI is the outward stock of FDI from country i (source) in country j (host), SUMGDP is the 
sum of the logs of the host country and the source country GDPs, SQDIFGDP is the squared 
difference in the GDPs of the host and source country, ADIFGDP is the absolute difference 
between them, ADIFSKILL is the absolute difference between the countries endowment of 
skilled labour and SQDIFSKILL is the corresponding squared difference. Distance is the 
great circle distance between the countries’ capital. Trade costs in the host are measured by 
the average tariff level between 1990 and 2000, iϕ is the source country dummy in order to 
capture the effects of possible systematic differences in the FDI.  
 
By using the benchmark model in Equation 1, Daude and Stein (2007) have estimated 
several models such as cross section OLS, instrumental variables (IV), robustness test and a 
variety of panel data estimations such as pooled OLS, random effects, fixed effects, Poisson 
regressions, Prais-Winsten, Generalised Method  of  Moment (GMM) and GEE.  
 4 
On the contrary, Busse and Hefeker (2007) have employed three difference models 
namely cross country analysis, fixed effect model and GMM models proposed by Arellano-
Bond (1991). Specifically, the benchmark regression models are the following: 
 
Model (Cross Country Analysis: Average 1984-2003) 
iiiii INFLATIONTRADEGROWTHGNIFDI lnlnlnlnln 43210 βββββ ++++=
 
             iiPOLITICALMMYREGIONALDU εββ +++ 65                                                       [2] 
 
Model Fixed-Effect (unbalanced panel) 
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Model Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) or instrumental variables (First Difference) 
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Where, GNI is Gross National Income per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) US 
Dollars to control for the market size, GROWTH is the real growth rate of GNI per capita as 
a proxy for market growth and potential, TRADE is the ratio of imports and exports to GDP 
to control for openness to trade, INFLATION is the GDP deflator as a proxy for 
macroeconomic policy inadequacies and  POLITICAL stand for one of the 12 indicators for 
political risk and institution. In addition, from Equation 4, itFDI∆  is the first difference of 
FDI flows and 1−∆ itFDI  is the first difference lagged of FDI flows as an instrumental 
variable. Therefore, to avoid the existence of multicollinearity, the political risks variables 
are added one by one to the benchmark regression (Equation 2 – Equation 4). 
 
2.4 Empirical Result     [Refer to Appendix 1-2 for the summary of empirical result] 
 
Cross-Section OLS Result 
Daude and Stein (2007) found that OLS model without including any institution variables has 
explained approximately 71 percent of the total variation in FDI stocks. The significant 
explanatory variables are the sum of GDPs, the squared difference of GDPs, distance and the 
absolute difference in factor endowments. In addition, distance has a negative effect on 
bilateral FDI, meanwhile the sum of GDPs has a significant positive effect.  Meanwhile, the 
empirical result which have taken into account the  roles of institution variables have shown a 
little improvement in R
2
. For instance, the model with institution variable has explained 
between 71% up to 75% of the total variation in FDI.  In addition, the results also depend on 
the specific dimension of institution. Voice and accountability, political stability, rule of law 
and control of corruption have no significant impact on FDI, whereas the regulatory quality 
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and government effectiveness have a positive and significant effect on the volume of FDI. 
The largest effect is the regulatory quality where a one standard deviation increased in this 
dimension of governance would increase FDI stocks by a factor of 2. Government 
effectiveness has slightly lower effect where one standard deviation improvement would 
imply an increased FDI stocks by a factor 1.4%. Besides that, model with institution (six 
regressors simultaneously) have shown that a negative sign of  voice and accountability (but 
not statistically significant) and rule of law (statistically significant). Others institutional 
variables such as regulatory quality, government effectiveness and political stability have the 
most relevance governance dimension in explaining the FDI inflows. 
 
In comparison, Busse and Hefeker (2007) are found that the model without institution 
has explained 67% of the total variation in FDI inflows. All the control variables except 
inflation are statistically significant to explain the variation of the FDI inflow. Meanwhile, 
after taking into account the institutional variables is it clearly stated that a little improvement 
in R
2
 that is between 67% to 70%. The results also show that only three out of twelve 
indicators of political risk have a positive and significant impact on FDI inflows, namely 
government stability, religious tension and democracy. This finding clearly stated that those 
countries with a lower political risk and better institutions which related to the three 
indicators received more FDI per capita in the period 1984 to 2003.  
 
Result of Panel Data 
Daude and Stein (2007) have employed a variety of panel data estimation, whereas 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) have utilized two panel data models namely the fixed effect model 
and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation. Busse and Hefeker (2007) have found that 
all control variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
level, except for trade which has the expected positive sign but is not statistically significant. 
In addition, the institutional variables that are government stability, investment profile, 
internal and external conflicts, law and order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic 
quality are positively and statistically significant at least at the 10% level connected with the 
FDI inflows. In fact, the results also indicate that government stability and democratic 
accountability are showed that foreign investors are also highly sensitive due to the changes 
in political stability and the framework in which government operate. In addition, 
fundamental democratic rights like civil liberties and political rights do matter to MNE’s 
operating in developing countries. Similarly, MNE’s appear to be concerned about internal 
and external conflicts that affect the host country because the effect on economic and political 
stability. The occurrence of these conflicts such as civil wars, trade sanctions, cross border 
conflicts and all-out war will create uncertainty in the future. Thus, investors increase the risk 
premium of investment projects, which in turn reduces overall investment as well as reduces 
foreign capital. Busse and Hefeker (2007) also employed the dynamic panels data proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) namely GMM estimator by using the first difference and 
instrument variables. The result shows that government stability, internal and external 
conflict, corruption, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and 
bureaucratic quality of the government matter for the investment decision of multinational as 
the respective coefficient are positive and statistically significant. The strongest significant 
level is 1%, for government stability, internal and external conflict and  law and order. The 
level of corruption is also significant in influencing the MNE’s.  Ethnic is also significantly 
associated with FDI in a dynamic setting, and investment profile is no longer significant in 
the GMM dynamic regression analysis.  
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In contrast, Daude and Stein (2007), have employed various panel data estimation in 
order to investigate the relevance of institution variables in attracting the FDI inflows. For 
instance, they estimated a various panel data analysis such as pooled OLS, random OLS, 
fixed effect, Poisson regression, Prais-Winsten, Arellano-Bond GMM estimator and panel- 
corrected standard errors GEE. The entire model indicated that the quality of institutions 
which is proxied by government stability (one of the ICRG component) has positively and 
significantly influences the inflow of FDI. In short, based on panel data evidence it is clearly 
stated that a significant and  pivotal  impact of institutions on  FDI.  
 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation 
One of the main difference between Daude and Stein (2007) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) is 
about the IV regression. Daude and Stein (2007) have utilised the instrumental variable 
techniques whereas Busse and Hefeker (2007) do not take into account the IV regression in 
their studies. Daude and Stein (2007) have stated that the standard cross section regression 
model could potentially be biased because of an endogeneity problem. The quality of 
institutions might be endogenous for two reasons. First, once the MNE’s already invested in 
particular countries, they might be demand for better institutions. Second, there is potentially 
bias expert report that a better score on the quality institution because they observed a high 
level of FDI. Therefore, the two difference sets of instrument are used in the study. Firstly, to 
instrument voice and accountability as well as political stability this study used an index of 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation (ELF) from Easterly and Levine (1997) and the average 
number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants during the 1990s. The second group of 
variables clustered in government efficiency which used the fraction of population that speak 
English and the fraction of the population that speak a western Europe language from Hall 
and Jones (1999). Thus, this study employed a set of dummy variables for Common Law, 
French Law, German Law and Scandinavian Law as instruments. The result of IV 
estimations shown that only government effectiveness and regulatory quality have a 
significant effect on FDI stocks, while the remaining variables are not significant.  Similarly, 
for the clustered institutional variables the result also indicates that government efficiency has 
a positive and significant effect on FDI, while both political stability and freedom have a 
negative effect.  
 
The quality of institutions has a significant effect and is economically important in 
influencing the location of FDI. Meanwhile, not all the dimensions of institutional framework 
have the same direct importance for the MNE’s decisions. Regulatory framework and the 
effectiveness of the government are the most important factors to attract the investors. The 
results also reveal no evidence of a direct effect of civil liberties and political violence in 
promoting FDI. In fact, the results are robust to difference estimation methods, definitions of 
the dependant variable and specifications. Some institutional variables have a greater impact 
on FDI than others. Especially institutions that create predictability regulatory and legal 
framework as well as policy stability are the most important. Overall, the empirical results 
clearly stated that the institutional variable has a significant and economically important 
impact on the location of FDI.  Therefore, it is very important for the host countries to 
maintain a high quality regulatory framework and the effectiveness of the government 
because these factors are the most sensitive aspect for foreign investors.  
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3. Comments and Suggestions 
Meanwhile, there are several comments for both articles. Firstly, the both article just 
considered several institution variables and did not concerned other important institutions 
variables which can also influence the behaviour of foreign investment. For instance, a good 
property right protection, a good quality of education system, no risk of expropriation and   
dimensions of market efficiency are also important and should be considered precisely by the 
government. In fact, the role of other institution variables such as social capital measures 
(civil liberties, economic freedom and civic community), others social characteristics (ethno 
linguistic fractionalisation and social development and capability) and political instability 
measurement (propensity for government change and duration of civil wars) are also 
important in influencing the behaviour of foreign investors.  
 
Second, a better institutional variable is an inadequately in explaining the behaviour 
of MNE’s. Therefore, a good interaction between institutional variables and other macro 
variables such as a well-developed financial system (financial deepening), favourable growth 
performance, high trade openness, excellent infrastructure development, low country risk as 
well as attractive fiscal and monetary incentive are also vital in order to attract the inflow of 
FDI to the host countries. In fact, all these variables are complementary to each other. For 
instance,  quality of institutions has no meaning if the host countries (particularly LDC’s) do 
not have a well-developed financial system, excellent infrastructure and others sound  
environment in order to maintain the inflow of foreign investment. Both article written by 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Daude and Stein (2007) have not taken into account the role of 
interaction effect between institution and other macroeconomics variables on FDI in their 
model.  Therefore, the further study should considered to test the hypothesis that the 
interaction between institutional quality and others macro variables has a separate influence 
on the FDI inflow to the host countries.  
 
Thirdly, the issue of difference measurement of institution should be considered 
precisely by the host countries because difference measurement indeed produces difference 
results. This will produce a robust result because the government does not know which one of 
the institutional variables is essential in order to attract FDI. Hence, to get a clear picture, the 
future study should be conducted at the firm level by conducting the survey to the MNC’s. 
This survey can capture how MNE’s are sensitive to the institutional variables in particular 
country in order to invest or to maintain their investment in the host countries. In fact, the 
result from the survey can be used by the government in order to improve the quality of 
institutions continuously.  The host countries government can also focus more on the 
particular institutional variables which are very sensitive for the investment decision by 
foreign investors. 
 
 Finally, in terms of econometric terminology, the future study should also considered 
the latest statistical analysis of dynamics panel data, namely the mean group (MG) and 
pooled mean group (PMG) estimators proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et. 
al (1999). These methods are appropriate to the analysis of dynamics panels that have both 
large time and cross sectional data sets. In fact, the both techniques have the advantage to 
capture the long run equilibrium and the possible heterogeneous dynamics adjustment 
process.  In addition, the future study can also consider separating the data sets into several 
categories of countries such as high, middle and low-income in order to investigate the 
heterogeneity effect of institutional variables on FDI.  
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4. Conclusions 
 In conclusion, there is without a doubt that appropriate institution (better quality of 
institution) plays a pivotal role in stimulating the inflow of foreign investment, particularly in 
developing countries which have experienced scarcity of capital, in order to generate their 
long term economic growth. Therefore, by maintaining a better quality of institution it can 
create an environment conducive in attracting the persistent inflow of foreign capital from 
MNE’s. Both the article written by Daude and  Stein (2007) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
have explained extensively the roles of institutions aspect in promoting the inflow of FDI. 
They found that most of the institutional variables positively and significantly influence the 
behaviour of foreign investment. In fact, in the long run for those countries which highly 
dependent on FDI, they should be considered several aspect of institutions quality such as 
government stability, regulatory quality, corruption and democratic accountability in order to 
attract continuously the inflow of foreign investment. 
 
It is true to say that a better quality of institutions must be associated with higher FDI, 
and subsequently will foster more economic growth in the host countries. As a one of the 
main channel of economic growth, it seems that FDI has played a favourable role in 
stimulating growth in many countries. In short, better institutions will attract more FDI which 
in turn will generate more growth in the long run. In fact, most of the empirical studies have 
concluded that FDI positively and significantly  influences economics growth. Therefore, the 
government particularly for the LDC’s has to implement a FDI-friendly policy in order to 
attract as well as to maintain the inflows of FDI.  This is very important due to the fact that 
FDI is not volatile and have many spill-over effects such as technology transfer, creating   
new job opportunity as well as access to new markets. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Arellano, M. and Bond, D. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economics Studies 58, 
277-297. 
Brunetti, A. and Weder, B. 1998. Investment and institutional uncertainty : a comparative 
study of difference uncertainty measures. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 134, 513-533. 
Busse, M. and Hefeker, C. 2007. Political risk, institution and foreign direct investment. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 23, 397-415. 
Carr, D.L., J.R. Markusen, and K.E. Maskus. 2001. Estimating the knowledge-capital model 
of the multinational enterprise. American Economic Review, 87, 520-544. 
Daude, C. and  Stein, E. 2007. The quality of institutions and foreign direct investment. 
Economics & Politics, vol. 19, 317-344. 
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 1997. Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1203-1250. 
Hall, R.E. and Jones, C.I. 1999.  Why do some countries produce so much more output per 
worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton. 1999a. Governance matters. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, 2196, Washington, DC. 
Lee, J-Y. and Mansfield, E. 1996. Intellectual property protection and U.S foreign direct 
investment. Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 181-186. 
 9 
Quere, B.A., Coupet, M. and  Mayer, T. 2007. Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment. The World Economy, 764-782. 
Pesaran, M. H. and R.P. Smith. 1995. Estimating long-run relationship from dynamics 
heterogeneous panels. Journal of Econometrics 68:1, 79-113. 
Pesaran, M. H., Y. Shin and R.P. Smith. 1999. Pooled mean group estimation of dynamic 
heterogeneous panels. Journal of American Statistical Association 94:446, 621-634. 
Schmieding, H. 1993. From plan to market: on the nature of the transformation crisis. 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 129, 216-253. 
Wei, S-J. 1997. Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax? Arbitrariness kills. NBER 
Working Paper 6255. 
Wei, S-J. 2000. How taxing is corruption to international investors? Review of Economics 
and Statistics 82, 1-11. 
 
 
 
 
 10 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Summary of Empirical Result: The Role of Institution on Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Panel Data Estimates Institutional variables Cross 
Section OLS 
IV 
(TSLS) Pooled OLS Random 
Effect 
Fixed Effect GMM GEE 
Voice & Accountability 0.022 
(0.10) 
-2.042 
(1.23) 
- - - - - 
Political Stability 0.251 
(1.25) 
0.143 
(0.31) 
- - - - - 
Government Effectiveness 0.355 
(1.93)* 
0.886 
(2.10)** 
- - - - - 
Regulatory Quality 0.702 
(3.38)*** 
2.098 
(2.96)** 
- - - - - 
Control of Corruption 0.815 
(1.00) 
0.546 
(1.41) 
 
- - - - - 
Rule of Law 0.129 
(0.70) 
0.572 
(1.26) 
- - - - - 
Political Stability & Freedom -0.379 
(1.23) 
-1.835 
(2.46)** 
- - - - - 
Government Efficiency 0.635 
(2.05)** 
2.303 
(2.95)*** 
- - - - - 
Government Stability - - 0.153 
(2.37)** 
0.200 
(5.80)*** 
0.232 
(6.58)*** 
0.121 
(2.12)*** 
0.208 
(5.27)*** 
 
Note:   Absolute robust White-corrected t-statistics in parentheses 
 * Significant in 10%, ** significant in 5%, *** significant in 1%. The coefficient of control variables not include in this table. 
              Dependent variable is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
 
Source: Daude & Stein (2007) 
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APPENDIX   2 
Summary of Empirical Result: The Role of Institution on Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Econometric Models 
Institutional  Variable 
Cross-Country Analysis, 
average 1984-2003
a 
Panel analysis, country fixed-
effect, 1984-2003
b 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-
data estimation, 1984-2003
c 
Government Stability 0.27 
(1.66)* 
0.17 
(4.04)*** 
0.18 
(2.6)*** 
Socio-economics indicators 0.1 
(0.61) 
-0.06 
(-0.98) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
Investment profile 0.92 
(0.42) 
0.15 
(2.77)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.83) 
Internal conflict 0.05 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(1.79)* 
0.15 
(2.86)*** 
External conflict 0.16 
(1.54) 
0.15 
(3.37*** 
0.14 
(2.47)*** 
Corruption -0.04 
(-0.35) 
0.06 
(1.08) 
0.12 
(1.79)* 
Military in politics 0.02 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(-0.56) 
0.13 
(1.28) 
Religious tensions 0.13 
(2.01)** 
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.07 
(1.07) 
Law and order -0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.09 
(2.05)** 
0.14 
(2.53)*** 
Ethnic tensions -0.01 
(-0.21) 
0.04 
(0.97) 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
Democratic accountability 0.14 
(2.29)** 
0.14 
(3.53)*** 
0.09 
(1.89)* 
Quality bureaucracy 0.07 
(1.27) 
0.08 
(2.06)** 
0.12 
(2.11)** 
a,b 
 t-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
c
 z-values reported in parentheses, *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
The coefficient of control variables not include in this table. Dependent variable is Foreign Direct Investment  
 
Source : Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
